Seeing and unseeing Prevent’s racialized borders by Ali, Nadya
Seeing and unseeing Prevent’s racialised borders with China 
Miéville’s ‘The City and the City’
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Ali, Nadya (2019) Seeing and unseeing Prevent’s racialised borders with China Miéville’s ‘The 
City and the City’. Security Dialogue. ISSN 0967-0106 (Accepted) 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/91120/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 
 
Seeing and Unseeing Prevent’s racialised borders with 
China Miéville’s ‘The City and the City’.  
 
Abstract 
This article provides a re-theorisation of the Prevent strategy as racialised bordering. 
It explores how knowledge regarding the racist logics of British counter-terrorism are 
supressed through structures of white ignorance and how IR scholarship is implicated 
in this tendency to ‘whitewash’ Prevent’s racism. Building on the use of science fiction 
(SF) in IR, the article uses China Miéville’s novel The City and the City to undertake 
the analysis. Miéville evokes a world where the cities of Ul Qoma and Besźel occupy 
the same physical space but are distinct sovereign jurisdictions. Citizens are 
disciplined to ‘see’ their city and ‘unsee’ the other city to produce borders between the 
two. The themes of coding signifiers of difference and seeing/unseeing as bordering 
practices are used to explore how Prevent racialises Muslims as outsiders to a white 
Britain in need of defending. Muslim difference is hypervisibilised or seen as potentially 
threatening and coded as part of a racialised symptoms which constitute radicalisation 
and extremism. This article shows how the racial bordering of Prevent sustains 
violence perpetrated by white supremacists which is subsequently ‘unseen’ through 
the case of Thomas Mair. 
Key words: Prevent strategy, racial borders, whiteness, CRT, right-wing extremism. 
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Introduction 
In June 2016, Darren Osbourne drove his van into Muslim worshippers outside 
Finsbury Park mosque in London, killing Makram Ali and injuring nine others. He was 
described as a ‘terrorist’ by the police and government (Rawlinson, 2018). The 
sentencing judge argued Osbourne had been “rapidly radicalised over the internet, 
encountering and consuming material put out […] from those determined to spread 
hatred of Muslims on the basis of their religion” (Ibid). Osbourne was prosecuted for 
terrorism-related murder under section 30 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. The 
case appears to reflect comments made by Lord Carlile of Berriew of the Prevent 
strategy review. He writes, “This new strategy is designed to endure. Already it has to 
deal with a range of terrorism threats, including Al Qa’ida and right-wing extremism” 
(HM Government, 2011: 3).  
Reflecting on the case of Osbourne, Prevent is constituted as a programme that 
intervenes in the lives of subjects ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation before criminal or 
terrorist offences have been committed. In 2017-18, 18% of referrals to the Prevent 
programme were related to ‘right-wing extremism’ while 44% were ‘Islamist extremists’ 
(Home Office, 2018: 4). 32% of referrals for the deradicalisation programme Channel 
were composed of ‘right-wing’ individuals, while 50% were ‘Islamist extremists’ (Ibid). 
Differences in referral numbers are explained by the perceived scale and organisation 
of threat posed by Islamists as compared to right-wing extremists (HM Government, 
2011: 15). Claims of treating right-wing extremists and ‘Islamists’ as equivalent are, 
however, impossible. Instead, this article argues that Prevent operates through 
racialised understandings of radicalisation and extremism that ‘border’ (van Houtum, 
Kramsch and Zierhofen, 2005) Muslim populations as a collective threat to white 
Britain while individualising the violence of white supremacists as the work of ‘lone 
wolves’. Prevent relies on the unseeing of racialised bordering to legitimate its own 
existence as a benign safeguarding structure designed to target more than ‘just’ 
Islamist radicals.  
Prevent has been analysed through the intersecting theoretical lenses of risk 
management, pre-emptive government, and the suspect communities thesis (Mythen, 
Walklate and Khan, 2009; Pantazis and Pemberton 2009). IR scholarship on Prevent 
has paid mixed attention to questions of ‘race’ and racialisation, frequently engaging 
in whitewashing (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019). While some contributions have 
tentatively explored the links between counter-radicalisation practices and racialised 
Muslim populations (Martin, 2018; Ragazzi, 2017; 2015), in other work these concerns 
are under-theorised leaving them either implicit (Heath-Kelly, 2013) or marginal 
and/or, absent (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018; Heath-Kelly, 2016; Heath-Kelly 2012; 
Martin 2014a; 2014b). Instead, this article engages with scholarship which centres 
processes of racialisation (Kapoor, 2018; Qurashi, 2018; Patel, 2017; Sian, 2017; 
Cohen and Tufail, 2017; Sabir 2017; Kundnani, 2014). However, what is yet to be 
addressed in these accounts is how constructions of Britishness are also racialised. 
The bordering of Muslim populations relies on the relational but unspoken constitution 
of Britain as a white nation which needs to be defended and the unseeing of this 
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process. Prevent functions to remove the actions of white supremacists from the 
context of the Britain they are seeking to defend thereby concealing a key site through 
which whiteness is reproduced. Therefore, the first contribution the article makes is 
theorising Prevent as racial bordering shows it is an inadequate policy response to 
right-wing extremism because it represents the continuation of white violence.  
Nevertheless, the argument that Prevent is inherently racialised is contested by 
politicians and practitioners (Hawkes and Pollard, 2017). The article shows how the 
unseeing of the racism of Prevent is predicated on structures of white ignorance linked 
to colonial amnesia (Mills, 2007; Applebaum, 2010). Colonial amnesia enables the 
construction of Britain as a white nation, consolidating the marginalisation of 
postcolonial others as ‘immigrants, foreigners, and outsiders’ (Tyler, 2012: 12). White 
ignorance works to reproduce this amnesia, turning ‘race’ into an attribute of the ‘other’ 
to be bordered and policed, leaving whiteness as unseen and unspoken within security 
discourses. The second contribution the article makes it to show how Prevent both 
relies on structures of white ignorance to make secret its racial logics and reproduces 
these through racialised bordering.  
To analyse Prevent’s constitution of racialised borders through seeing and 
unseeing the article turns to China Miéville’s novel The City and the City (TCACT). 
The article builds on Kiersey and Neumann’s view that SF can disrupt the aspects of 
the social world which are taken for granted (2016). Within the world of TCACT, two 
cities, Ul Qoma and Besźel, occupy the same physical space but exist not only 
independently of one another, but such that the ‘other’ city is unseen. Citizens are 
trained as children to experience their own city – its sites, smells, and sounds – and 
‘unsee’ the city which is other until they cross an official border; one that is policed by 
a sovereign force called Breach. Drawing on TCATC and insights from the literature 
on borders, white ignorance, and Critical Race Theory (CRT), the themes of coding 
signifiers of difference and seeing/unseeing, are used to recover the racial borders of 
Prevent. While in TCATC the self is visibilised and the other is unseen, Prevent 
operates in reverse to hypervisibilise the threatening difference of Muslim others and 
the unseeing of white supremacist terrorism as structural violence tied to defences of 
white Britain.    
The article is organised into three sections. The first examines literature which 
whitewashes the racial logics of Prevent. This section moves on to look at literature 
that locates Prevent within the intersection of racialisation, counter-terrorism, and the 
war on terror, understood as a global racist project (Razack, 2008). The second 
section turns to TCATC and its themes of the codification of difference and 
seeing/unseeing, as well as the literature on borders, white ignorance, and CRT, to 
read the racial borders of Prevent. The third section uses these themes to analyse 
how structures of seeing/unseeing hypervisibilise Muslim populations and conceal 
structural white violence through safeguarding discourses. Ultimately the article seeks 
to show how racialised security policy contributes to the reproduction of whiteness.  
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Reading Prevent: whitewashing in IR scholarship and the war on terror as a global 
racial formation. 
IR scholarship on Prevent draws on intersecting frameworks of risk 
management, pre-emptive government, and paradigms of suspicion (Ragazzi, 2017, 
2015; Heath-Kelly, 2016; 2013; 2012; Martin, 2018; 2014a, 2014b). ‘Race’ and 
racialisation have occupied an ambivalent place in these analyses, enabling the 
whitewashing of Prevent. This reflects a wider disciplinary tendency to write out the 
centrality of ‘race’ from the genesis, practice and theorisation of IR (Vitalis, 2015; 
Hobson, 2012). Anievas, Manchanda and Shilliam note, ‘questions of race and racism 
have been pushed to the margins of contemporary IR’ (2015: 2). More pertinent for 
this analysis, are the insights produced though Foucauldian Security Studies (FSS), 
which have provided the dominant ‘critical’ perspectives through which the global war 
on terror has been examined. Howell and Richter-Montpetit argue FSS fails to 
adequately theorise ‘race and coloniality’ leading to the whitewashing of how the 
politics of security is read (2018). The tendency toward what Bhambra (2017) calls 
‘methodological whiteness’, amounts to either the expulsion of racism from analyses 
of Prevent, or a failure to engage with the racial context of how Muslims are construed 
as ‘risky’. 
Two examples of this tendency include Heath-Kelly (2012) and Martin (2014a), 
who draw on the literature on risk and the war on terror to explore the governing 
functions of Prevent. Despite their distinctive understanding of the role of risk, both 
converge on the understanding Prevent is an attempt to mitigate the threat of terrorism 
through the production of knowledge about future threats. They regard Prevent as 
generative of pre-emptive interventions in the present to manage unknowable futures. 
There is a shared understanding Muslim populations are subjects of suspicion, 
threatening to a normalised British identity and to be rendered governable through 
Prevent. However, these accounts do not engage with ‘race’ and racialisation in the 
constitution, implementation, and effects of security practices. Counter-intuitively, this 
is evident in the recognition that ‘Muslims’ are the target population of counter-
terrorism practices, but this framing only implies but does not explicitly interrogate 
othering as a racialised process with a postcolonial history (Heath-Kelly, 2013).  
Key racial occlusions are further reflected in Martin’s (2018) analysis of regimes 
of (in)visibility. This is despite a discussion of how such processes operate to ensure 
‘‘Muslimified subjects’ are most likely to be visibilised as potential terrorists’ through 
the Channel programme. Analysis of the panopticon does not acknowledge how this 
penal technology was ‘colonising in method’ (Mitchell, 1988: x), honed in colonial 
contexts (Kaplan, 1995) and continues to be indispensable to contemporary settler 
colonial states (Lentin, 2007). Feminist Surveillance Studies have shown racial politics 
is constitutive of panoptical technologies and not one of the possible ‘lenses’ through 
which populations are made into subjects (Smith, 2015). The failure to acknowledge 
‘race’ as constitutive of security practices is manifest in how racism is consigned to 
being one of the many possible side-effects of Prevent as opposed to being its 
condition of possibility. Thus, processes of racialisation can be read into analyses of 
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Prevent (Martin, 2018) just as easily as they can be erased from them (Heath-Kelly, 
2016). However, for many scholars, ‘race’ has been at the core of the war on terror, 
its practices and representations of Muslim populations across different contexts.  
Omi and Winant argue ‘race’ is ‘a way of “making up people”’ (2015: 105). They 
show how processes of race-making have been central to the production of ‘regimes 
of domination, inequality, and difference’ in the US (2015: 106). Racialisation operates 
to ‘order bodies’ and ‘attribute differential value’ to them (Bhattacharyya, 2015: 112). 
Being racialised is tied to being visibilised, as a racial subject who embodies particular 
characteristics. ‘Races’ do not have any substantive content and in this sense race-
making is fictive because it does not have a basis in physical or cultural realities. 
Regimes of racialisation and hierarchies of racialised subjects shift over time and 
across contexts (Shilliam, 2018; Virdee, 2014). Processes of racialisation have 
historically been connected to and have facilitated projects of European colonialism, 
the Atlantic slave trade, indigenous genocide, extractivism, and settler-colonialism.  
Cainkar and Selod situate the war on terror as a white project in a longer history 
of ‘global white supremacy’ (2018: 167). Thobani (2007) similarly describes the war 
on terror as a ‘white war’ waged on the civilisational premise of bringing to heel savage 
Muslims who ‘hate our freedoms’. Prevent must be considered as part of this literature 
which examines the links between ‘race’, borders, counter-terrorism practices and 
their circulation from the ‘international’ to the ‘domestic’ (Sabir, 2017). Razack (2008) 
describes the war on terror as the ‘casting out’ of Muslims from Western law and 
politics. She claims ‘race thinking’ denies ‘a common bond between people of 
European descent and those who are not’ and a ‘colour-lined’ world which determines 
those worthy of rights and those not, are the characteristics which mark the war on 
terror as a global racial formation (Razack: 2008: 6). Kapoor also shows how, in the 
UK, bordering practices of deportation, extradition, and citizenship deprivation, as 
expressions of state racism, are made possible by the ‘less-than-citizen’ positioning of 
Muslims in Western states (2018).  
Prevent is located in a global configuration of raced discourses and practices 
which border Muslim populations across different contexts. Kundnani emulates this 
perspective through his examination of racialised surveillance infrastructures in the UK 
and US, instituted through the domestic war on terror. These findings are taken up in 
the work of Qurashi (2018) who explores how the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 
(2015) made radicalisation prevention a legal duty in the public sector. The Prevent 
Duty has extended the sites across which surveillance of Muslim populations is now 
possible. Kundnani also argues radicalisation models which proliferated after 9/11 
were fundamentally racialised insofar as they conceptualise terrorism as a product of 
‘Muslim culture’ rather than being part of larger historically situated political 
antagonism (2014: 10). Sian shows how ideas of radicalisation underpinning Prevent 
are expressions of colonial style race-science which, under the cover of positivist 
criminology, seek to produce and action ‘scientific’ frameworks of who is a potential 
terrorist (2017). She argues “In the same way that Lombroso employed the ‘scientific 
6 
 
method’ to develop typologies to draw conclusions around criminality, the Prevent 
programme has similarly attempted to use a scientifically based framework to draw 
evaluations around extremism.” (2017: 2).   
Yet, in spite of the extensive contributions outlined here, the literature on 
Prevent does not adequately engage with how the racialisation of Muslim subjects 
through surveillance techniques exists in relation to the reproduction of whiteness in 
Britain. Cainker and Selod are clear that the ‘war on terror’s racial project intersects 
with the historic U.S racial project of white supremacy’ (2018: 165). The literature on 
Prevent does not systematically engage with either British colonial history or whiteness 
as crucial context for understanding the provenance and significance of Prevent. 
Nadine El-Enany’s assertion that Britain is best understood as a racialised imperial 
formation centred on whiteness, is essential in unearthing Prevent’s racist logics 
(2019). This means looking at how the racialisation of Muslim populations as 
threatening is constitutive of a white Britain in need of defending and the unseeing of 
this process. The article turns to TCATC, and its exploration of the coding of difference 
and seeing/unseeing, in order to analyse Prevent as racialised bordering.  
TCATC: codifying difference, seeing/unseeing, and visibilising whiteness. 
The turn to popular culture in IR has entailed an increasing engagement with SF 
for researching and teaching global politics (Caso and Hamilton, 2016). A 
thoroughgoing analysis of SF and IR, is outside the scope of this article (see Kirby, 
2017) but this article offers a distinctive way of utilising SF. Namely, this is to use 
TCATC to recover the racial borders of Prevent which are obscured from view. This 
approach contrasts the predominant tendency in SF/IR scholarship which deploys SF 
as forms of analogy and descriptive analogy to ‘recruit the speculative and the 
fantastical to make sense of world politics not because those narratives trouble or 
undermine or reimagine it, but because they replicate it in a way that is taken to be 
more easily digestible’ (Kirby, 2017: 582). TCATC is not used as a mirror for the ‘real’ 
world in which cities of Ul Qoma and Besźel and substituted for populations and 
political orders in the here-and-now of global politics. Rather, the techniques of 
codifying signifiers of difference and seeing/unseeing in the production of borders are 
theorised as political practices which, in conjunction with literature on borders, white 
ignorance, and CRT, can be used to recover the raced borders of Prevent.  
Coding signifiers of difference and the construction of ‘place’. 
When a PhD student from the US named Mahalia Geary is murdered, her body is 
found in Besźel, though it later transpires she was killed in Ul Qoma. The investigation 
is led by Besźel detective Tyador Borlú, who, early in the novel, receives a phone call 
from an informant in Ul Qoma claiming to have information about Geary after seeing 
posters of her in Besźel. Borlú notes, “My informant should not have seen the posters. 
They were not in his country. He should never have told me. He made me an 
accessory. This information was allergen in Besźel – the mere fact of it in my head 
was a kind of trauma.” (2009: 43). Borlú, like all citizens of Ul Qoma and Besźel, has 
been taught as a child to see his city and unsee the ‘other’ city, the cardinal rule which 
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the informant is breaking. In sharing this information, the informant not only implicates 
the detective in the crime of breaching borders, but, in so doing he creates trauma for 
Borlú. He later notes, “It was, not surprisingly that day perhaps, hard to observe 
borders, to see and unsee only what I should, on my way home.” (2009: 44). This 
section explores how, central to upholding the border, is the coding of differences 
which construct Besźel and Ul Qoma as ‘places’. For Borlú to be able to see correctly 
relies on him being able to identify the signifiers which constitute the self (‘Besźel’) and 
the simultaneous unseeing of that which constitutes the other (‘Ul Qoma’).  
Writing about TCATC from the perspective of international law, Douglas 
Guilfoyle notes, ‘The novel presents a vision of jurisdiction (or sovereignty) which is 
detached from territory (as an exclusionary construct) but which remains embedded 
in place (as something constructed by social practice). In the novel, two different 
streets, two different places as experienced by citizens, may occupy the same space’ 
(2016: 195). References to what make Besźel and Ul Qoma ‘places’, enabling citizens 
to differentiate the cities, permeate the novel. Peter Cowley and Barbara Hanna (2014) 
provide a breakdown of the cultural signifiers which differentiate the cities ranging from 
currency, international investors, language, political regime, to the everyday, and less 
obviously politicised, including beverage of choice, fashion, stereotypical culinary 
ingredient and standards of time-keeping. Throughout the novel we observe Borlú 
commenting on these differences.  
Ul Qoma is regarded as the more affluent and ‘up and coming’ city reflected in 
its foreign investors and exuberant dress, whereas poorer Besźel is rather more drab 
and depressing. In one scene Borlú notes, ‘Most of those around us were in Besźel 
so we saw them. Poverty deshaped the already staid, drab cuts and colours that 
characterise Besź clothes – what has been called the city’s fashionless fashion’. 
(2009: 21). Later, when Borlú visits Ul Qoma, he notes, ‘It was strange for me not to 
unsee these people in formal Ul Qoma dress – men in collarless shirts and dark lapel-
less jackets, the few women in spiral semiwraps in colours that would be contraband 
in Besźel’. (72) The aesthetic cues of which places citizens see and unsee are 
reflected in other points of difference, including architecture. Buildings in Besźel are 
taller than those in Ul Qoma, ‘familiarly deco-angled’ (21) and painted in ‘Besźel blue’ 
(65), a colour which is illegal in Ul Qoma. When Borlú visits Ul Qoma, he reflects on 
investment driven building boom which, in his view, amounts to ‘architectural 
vandalism’ and notices the ‘traditional baroque curlicues’ which adorn heritage sites’ 
(162).  
Borlú’s feelings of strangeness in Ul Qoma are brought into sharp focus through 
an earlier scene in the novel, where the detective and an accompanying police officer 
Lizybet Corwi, visit Besźel’s little Ul Qomatown. Borlú notes, ‘With the particular 
colours and script of the shop fronts, the shape of its facades, visitors to Besźel who 
saw it would always think they were looking at Ul Qoma […] But with a more careful 
eye, experience, you note the sort of cramped kitsch to the buildings’ designs, a squat 
self-parody’ (65). When asked by Corwi what they are doing in Ul Qomatown, Borlú 
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offers her ‘cinnamon lentils, thick set tea’ in response, which is to help him ‘get into the 
spirit of Ul Qoma’ (66). However, his discombobulation at being in the real Ul Qoma is 
strongly manifest in his dislike of spices common to Ul Qoman cuisine, prompting a 
local to suggest ‘You miss potatoes’ (235). His discomfort in Ul Qoma, of having to 
see, hear, and consume the other, and unsee his own lifeworld, underlines the extent 
to which signifiers of difference are constitutive of Borlú’s character and inhabit his 
very tastes, gestures, and manners (93). The construction of place and its embodiment 
in the lives of citizens, is tied to the bordering practices of seeing and unseeing, to 
which the discussion turns next. 
Seeing/Unseeing as bordering  
 Borlú frequently informs the reader about the ways bordering practices of 
seeing/unseeing are taught to citizens of the cities. He notes, ‘As kids we would 
assiduously unsee Ul Qoma, as our parents and teachers had relentlessly trained us’ 
(86). The pedagogical efforts which instil seeing/unseeing are tied to the successful 
identification of signifiers of difference which construct Besźel and Ul Qoma as places. 
From this perspective, practices of seeing/unseeing are an exploration of Balibar’s 
contention that ‘borders are no longer at the border’ (1998: 217-18) but are an intimate 
part of everyday life (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2018). The everyday nature 
of the border means it is deeply embedded in the psyche of citizens; Borlú describes 
this as the ‘deep prediscursive instinct for our borders that Besź and Ul Qomans have’ 
(2009: 93). TCATC reflects key insights from Critical Border Studies (CBS), which 
have shifted our understanding of borders away from naturalised physical frontiers of 
nation-states to political practices which constitute social order through a demarcation 
of inside/outside (Walker, 1993; Newman, 2003; Parker and Vaughan-Williams, 
2012). This conceptualisation replaces more orthodox notions of the border as that 
which demarcates states, understood as containers for a priori nations and cultures, 
from each other. Instead, bordering produces state identities, gives rise to practices of 
security and government, and enables and constrains political possibilities. Van 
Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer note, ‘a border is not so much an object or a material 
artefact as a belief, an imagination that creates and shapes a world, a social reality’ 
(2005: 3).  
In his visit to Ul Qoma and in the course of the investigation, Borlú tells the 
reader, ‘I saw groups of Ul Qomans unsee me because of my clothes and the way I 
held myself, double-take and see my visitor’s mark, and see me.’ (172). He describes 
his own struggle to unsee his hometown, ‘I held my breath, I was unseeing Besźel. I 
had forgotten what this was like; I had tried and failed to imagine it. I was seeing Ul 
Qoma’ (162). As bordering practices, seeing/unseeing inculcate ideas of place and 
belonging based on discussed signifiers of difference, into the minds of citizens. Not 
being able to imagine life in the other city captures the security logics of bordering 
practices. The security of the cities relies on the expulsion of difference embodied in 
the ‘other’ city, to the extent that houses which sit next to each other, but are in the 
respective cities, must be unseen. The rights of citizens rely on their ability to uphold 
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the fiction of living in a mono-cultural city, rather than one utterly enmeshed in 
difference and, where, you may walk past someone who is geographically proximate 
but not of your ‘place’.  
The codification of difference and seeing/unseeing are political practices which 
b/order space and produce political order (van Houtum, Kramsch and Zierhofer). 
These are everyday practices which institutionalise, and enforce, standards of who 
belongs and who does not, and of who ‘we’ are, through the exclusion of who we are 
not (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss, and Cassidy, 2017). They construct deeply held, 
embodied, and materially inscribed ideas of ‘place’, policed through the exclusion of 
anything that does not belong, through seeing/unseeing. They offer a lens through 
which the racial borders of Prevent can be read by focusing on the construction of 
difference and who/what is (in)visibilised as a security threat. However, ‘race’ itself is 
not one of the markers of difference in TCATC, though racism features as something 
that happened in the past. In order to use the codification of difference and 
seeing/unseeing to recover the racial borders of Prevent, these techniques must be 
understood in the context of the politics of whiteness. 
Visibilising whiteness, CRT, and white ignorance. 
Studies of racisms in Britain imbricating differently racialised and gendered 
others are extensive (for further discussion see: Sivanandan, 1976; Hall et al 1978; 
Carby, 1982; Gilroy, 1987; Solomos, 2003). But the same cannot be said for research 
which looks at the intersection of Britain as a post-imperial formation and white 
supremacy, scholarship which is considerably more limited (Tyler, 2012; Schwarz, 
2011; Atkinson, 2017; Wemyss, 2009). The relatively recent arrival of CRT from the 
US to the UK, which takes white supremacy and whiteness as central objects of 
analysis, speaks to this lack (Hylton, 2012). The antecedents of CRT lie in the earlier 
work of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars in the US, where, for example, Bell and 
Crenshaw undertaken with the aim of challenging racist political orders (Crenshaw, 
Gotanda, Peller, and Thomas, 1996). UK-based CRT scholars have unwittingly 
highlighted the historic paucity of thinking around white supremacy in the British 
context, hastening their own engagements with a body scholarship firmly established 
in the US and its particular racial history (Gilborn, 2006). However, for Warmington, 
CRT represents a continuation of ‘Black intellectual production’ in the UK (2012: 5).  
Beginning from the premise that racism is a ‘permanent feature of modern 
social formations’, CRT interrogates and rejects liberal models of race-equality and 
discourses of colour-blind and post-racial societies (Warmington, 2019: 4). These are 
considered to be insidious fictions crucial to the maintenance of white supremacy 
through the marginalisation of concerns around the persistence of structured racism 
(Ibid). CRT centres the analysis of white supremacy conceived of as ‘a political 
system, a particular power structure of formal and informal rule, privilege, 
socioeconomic advantages’ (Taylor cited in Warmington, 2019: 6); moreover, white 
supremacy is regarded as ‘systemic and global’ (ibid). From this perspective, 
whiteness emerges as a racial category through which populations racialised as ‘white’ 
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– not simply ‘white’ people - benefit from this designation through what Harris 
describes as ‘racial caste’ (1993). Applebaum reminds us ‘whiteness is not merely 
about skin color alone but involves culturally, socially, politically and institutionally 
produced and reproduced system of institutional processes and individual practices’ 
(2010: 9). Thus, whiteness is not a matter of ‘bad’ racists and ‘well intentioned’ whites; 
intentionality is complicated through Applebaum’s contention that everyone racialised 
as white is complicit in the reproduction of white supremacy.  
The benefits of whiteness, or ‘white privilege’ have been explored in a wider 
literature, through the context of property relations (Harris, 1993), constructions of the 
‘white’ working class (Roediger, 1991; Shilliam, 2017), as well scholarship in 
Education Studies cited above. What unites this literature is idea white supremacist 
structures function through the invisibility of whiteness as a racial identity. The naming 
of whiteness is politically integral to CRT, because, as Dyer notes, ‘As long as race is 
something only applied to non-white peoples, as long as white people are not racially 
seen and named, they/we function as the human norm.’ (2005: 10). This article is 
particularly interested in notions of white ignorance, a term coined by Charles W. Mills, 
to visibilise the historically contingent ways in which structured ‘non-knowing’ conceals 
and perpetuates white supremacy (2007: 20). White ignorance is produced in a 
context where ‘one has an agreement to misinterpret the world […] but with the 
assurance that this set of mistaken perceptions will be validated by white epistemic 
authority’ (Mills, 2007: 35). His epistemology of ignorance shows ‘non-knowing’ is an 
active practice serving to sustain white domination and not the product of a lack of 
education. In the British context, white ignorance is tied to the broader project of 
imperial amnesia.  
Imperial amnesia and imperial nostalgia are concepts which have been 
deployed to explain the victory of the Leave campaign in the referendum on EU 
membership in 2016 (El-Enany, 2018; Virdee and McGeever, 2018). Koram and 
Nişancıoğlu (2017) write about ‘the widespread surprise about the descendants of 
imperial subjects arriving onto the British mainland’ serving to disrupt the formerly 
white idyll of Britain. A British exit from the EU was cast as an ‘opportunity’ to close 
the borders – or ‘take back control’ - and revive imperial Britain (El-Enany, 2018). The 
Leave campaign rhetoric was emblematic of a white ignorance around the British 
Empire, or what Wemyss calls the ‘Invisible Empire’. Wemyss shows how invisibility 
functions to ‘assert(s) particular narratives of Britain’s past whilst supressing 
alternative histories, especially about the British Empire and related histories of white 
violence’ (2009: 3). White ignorance which constitutes the Invisible Empire entails not 
just the forgetting of atrocities, but the absence of a narrative about why populations 
from South Asia or the Caribbean, among others, migrated and settled in the British 
metropole. Furthermore, white ignorance ‘denies postcolonial people who live in the 
UK their place in the history of Englishness and Britishness’ as well ‘their place in 
contemporary formations of the nation’ (2012:12). Populations designated as ‘Muslim’ 
or ‘Bangladeshi’, for example, are cast as raced outsiders, interlopers in a landscape 
of a whitened Britain.  
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Understanding the practices of codifying difference and seeing/unseeing in the 
context of white ignorance and CRT, provides a racial lens to assess how the 
institutionalisation and policing of standards of belonging through Prevent operates. 
Firstly, the codification of difference in the construction of place are to be understood 
as racialised practices. Rendering Muslim populations as outsiders to white Britain 
through Prevent, relies on the racial codification of difference. Secondly, the bordering 
practices of seeing/unseeing work to embed and then obscure the construction of 
racial hierarchies of belonging. Seeing/unseeing operate to conceal the racial logics 
of Prevent by erasing how constructions of Muslim as threatening are tied to defences 
of a white Britain. The visbilisation of Prevent’s racialised borders, which seek to 
determine who is included and excluded from white Britain, who is threatening and 
who is not, can then be understood as ‘a sociology of (white) ignorance’ (Mills, 2007: 
23). The article brings to bear an understanding of how whiteness produces structured 
ignorance regarding the constitution of security threats.  
Visibilising Prevent’s racialised borders: coding Muslim difference, safeguarding, and 
unseeing Thomas Mair. 
 This final section visibilises the racial borders of Prevent through a study of how 
difference is coded and place constructed. The analysis explores the racialised coding 
of radicalisation and extremism as symptoms of Muslim difference, which threaten an 
unspoken but normalised white British identity. This section moves on to show how 
racialised borders are unseen through safeguarding, which provides a bureaucratic 
means for empowering gut instinct decision-making around who is a radical. These 
decisions are based on racialised knowledge about who is a security threat, which is 
hinted at, but not made explicit in training. Finally, the unseeing of Prevent’s racial 
borders and their role in sustaining white violence is explored through of a case of 
right-wing extremist violence. When Thomas Mair assassinated Labour MP Jo Cox, 
he was cast as a lone wolf with mental health problems. This section will show right-
wing extremism is unseen as structured racial violence through Prevent, because it 
functions as part of a white ‘background to social action’ (Ahmed: 2007). Simply put, 
right-wing extremism is part of a broader normalised continuum of racial violence in 
Britain. Mair’s views on immigration and refugees which drove his violence towards 
Cox, whom he regarded as a ‘traitor’, were continuous with the defence of white Britain 
normalised through Prevent. They were also embodied in the Vote Leave campaign 
on the Brexit referendum in which context the assassination took place.  
Coding Muslim difference as radical and extreme 
 The first iteration of the Prevent strategy (2006) makes no mention of right-wing 
extremism. This occurs later in 2009 with an acknowledgement that more must be 
done to tackle ‘domestic forms of violent extremism’ (HM Government, 2009: 12). This 
language illustrates the British citizens who carried out the London bombings in 2005, 
were not considered to be adequately British. The unremitting focus of early Prevent 
work and its conceptualisation of radical and extreme were exclusively concerned with 
Muslim populations and the threat they posed to white Britain (Kundnani, 2009). 
Where Borlú and the citizens of Ul Qoma and Besźel are taught to unsee the difference 
embodied in the Other city, Prevent has hypervisibilised racialised Muslim populations, 
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who pose a pre-eminent security threat to white Britain. Muslim difference should be 
understood not as primarily religious but rooted in a British history of racialisation and 
colonialism (Pasha, 2017). While there is an understanding ‘notions of race were 
mobilised to arrange humans according to phenotypical differences’ in order to 
legitimise European colonialism (Sian, 2017: 3), how this intersects with religious 
difference is not sufficiently understood. Claire Alexander explains “the spectre of 
‘race’ as key signifier of religio-cultural difference […] is impossible, and indeed 
disingenuous, to separate either Islam from Muslims themselves, or ‘Muslims’ from 
the black and brown bodies who form the largest proportion of Muslim in Britain, and 
globally.” (2017: 15).  
 The construction of racialised Muslim difference as threatening to, and outside 
of, white Britain is produced through Prevent’s regulation of ‘brown bodies' (Patel, 
2017). Muslim bodies are racialised through a mixture of ‘religious, cultural, and 
phenotypical identification’ which converge to produce an idea of ‘Muslimness’ (Sian, 
2017: 4). This understanding of Muslim difference combines biological attributes (skin 
colour) with religious and cultural practices including clothing (hijab, niqab, skull caps, 
kurtas), eating (halal meat, inhibitions on alcohol and pork) and a strong imaginary 
about the radical otherness of ‘Muslim’ practices which are not British (Ali and 
Whitham, 2018). This imaginary has included, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM), 
Forced Marriage (FM), veiling, a supposed propensity for electoral fraud, the 
imposition of sharia law, and child sexual exploitation (Alexander, 2017). Signifiers of 
radicalisation and extremism are synonymous with the coding of Muslim difference 
and the corresponding unspoken reproduction of Britain as a white nation.  
White Britain is constructed through what Claire Crawford (2017) has called 
‘white British’ norms, embodied in the introduction of Fundamental British Values 
(FBV). FBV are defined in opposition to extremist values exemplified by radical Islamic 
groups like al-Qaeda, and which, according to the British government, are held by 
many Muslims and Muslim organisations in Britain (HM Government, 2011: 1). As 
Crawford argues, ‘the context of FBVs are racially coded and arguably refer to native 
(white British) cultural norms and mores only’ and she critical that any of these values 
is especially British in light of the ‘colonialism, enslavement, and racism’ Britain is 
founded on (2017: 199). In the government’s view, to be opposed to FBV, is to be 
outside the norms of white Britain and an extremist:  
 […] vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the 
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members 
of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas. (HM Government, 2013: 1). 
FGM and FM are regarded as symptoms of extremism precisely because they are 
located within an imaginary of Muslim difference and outside the norms of white Britain 
(Jones, 2019). Moreover, the construction of racialised Muslim difference through 
Prevent has led to the collective responsibilisation of all Muslims for terrorism and 
designated the ‘Muslim community’ as a distinctive spatial, religious, and cultural 
configuration, in challenging this (Qurashi, 2018). Prevent cites ‘Muslim communities’ 
as the principal sites of radicalisation where Muslims are ‘aware’ of what is going on 
(HM Government, 2006: 2). This was the premise of Preventing Extremism Together 
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(2005), a Britain-wide consultation with prominent Muslim figures following the London 
bombings in 2005. The need to engage with Muslims was driven by the idea that secret 
knowledge of terrorism and radicalism is held exclusively by Muslims. 
Structures and practices of surveillance are not only embedded within Muslim 
spaces such as mosques or youth organisations. The Prevent Duty has made 
radicalisation prevention a statutory obligation across the public sector; Muslims 
encounter Prevent in schools (Walker, 2019), universities (Scott-Baumann, 2017), the 
NHS (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018), prisons and through social services. Younis 
and Jadhav (2019) note that while the Prevent Duty brings everyone who encounters 
public sector institutions under the purview of counter-radicalisation surveillance 
through the collection of big data, the delivery and implementation of Prevent is still 
racially marked. They showed Muslim staff felt ‘silenced’ from voicing questions in 
Prevent training, for fear they would be labelled ‘terrorist sympathisers’ as they were 
already viewed ‘through a lens of suspicion’ due to their racial positioning (Younis and 
Jadhav, 2019: 412). Similarly, Walker shows how Muslim school children in East 
London feel silenced from speaking about politically sensitive topics in case of Prevent 
referrals. 
Prevent training and safeguarding 
 ‘Prevent is safeguarding’ is a maxim repeated by Prevent practitioners to 
counter accusations of racism (Cornish, 2016). The Prevent Duty has translated 
radicalisation prevention into a matter of safeguarding vulnerable individuals thereby 
erasing the racialised nature of this work. The Care Act (2014) introduced 
safeguarding as ‘protecting a person’s right to live in safety, free from abuse and 
neglect.’ (NHS, 2014: 1). Prevent, implemented as safeguarding aims to move the 
vulnerable away from radicalisation and terrorism (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018). It 
is through practices of safeguarding that Prevent is unseen as racially marked while 
tacitly empowering the gut instincts of practitioners to make decisions which rely on 
racialised knowledge.  
Safeguarding enables the unseeing of racism embedded in ideas of 
radicalisation and extremism, underneath bureaucratic language and practice. Heath-
Kelly and Strausz found Prevent safeguarding is deeply politicised as it facilitates 
information sharing between the healthcare practitioners and counter-terrorism 
officers. This happens by responsibilising practitioners to make decisions about 
whether someone is a radical. GP Siema Iqbal (2016) writes, ‘I clearly understand the 
definition of safeguarding when it comes to child neglect, physical abuse and sexual 
abuse. In relation to extremism, however, there appears to be no shared consensus 
or definition as to what children should be safeguarded from”. But, the lack of a shared 
definition regarding radicalisation and extremism enables rather than inhibits the ability 
of white practitioners in particular, to make referrals based on their gut instincts about 
who is threatening to Britain.   
 Prevent training sessions, known as WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness 
about Prevent), become spaces of white ignorance, in the same way Borlú describes 
unseeing as a deliberative practice. There are six case study videos, two are 
concerned with the far-right and three with al-Qaeda. The training includes 
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‘Introduction’, ‘Susceptabilities’ (sic), ‘The risk of radicalisation,’ ‘Behaviours,’ ‘What to 
do,’ and ‘Action Plan’ (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018). There is a script to deliver the 
training. Practitioners are encouraged not to engage with the content of ideologies, 
which would require them to have political and theological knowledge, but the 
emotional states of their patients (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018: 41). The feelings of 
practitioners, about who is radical are responsibilised to make judgements about 
security threats. In their survey of 329 practitioners, Heath-Kelly and Strausz found the 
majority of respondents were ‘strongly confident’ that WRAP training had explained 
the signs of radicalisation. Respondents expressed ‘strong comfort’ in their experience 
of undergoing training, while 58% were confident or extremely confident in their ability 
to make a referral after the training. However, there was a greater degree of ambiguity 
over whether Prevent referrals constitute safeguarding, or whether it should be a part 
of health-care. The responses to whether Prevent is a form of surveillance garnered a 
split decision.  
Despite the wider lack of certainty over whether radicalisation prevention is 
safeguarding and therefore in the purview of NHS work, practitioners were still 
confident to make referrals. When asked if practitioners would make a safeguarding 
referral if patients possessed ‘radical Islamist’ or anarchist philosophy, or, if patients 
had watched beheading videos, the answer was predominantly, ‘yes’. Heath-Kelly and 
Strausz conclude, radicalisation is understood through a wider cultural framework than 
the narrow framing evident in training videos. Fernandez, Walker and Younis (2018) 
argue, “Gut feelings and instincts about individuals are produced through racialised 
understandings of risk and vulnerability […] these risks take the form of Muslim-looking 
individuals.” This is what Borlú describes in TCATC as the ‘deep prediscursive instinct’ 
for the border. In other words, racialised ideas of who is threatening are already 
circulating, they need only to be hinted at through references to beheading videos 
which invoke ideas of Muslim savagery (James, 2016), for instance, prompting a 
practitioner to make a referral and thus producing the racial border. Tacit racialised 
knowledge empowers white practitioners to make referrals while at the same time 
silencing Muslim practitioners from speaking out (Younis and Jadhav 2019).  
Seeing Thomas Mair 
 The racial borders of Prevent do not simply function to hyper-visibilise Muslim 
populations, but, they also serve to invisibilise the violence of right-wing extremists as 
structured white violence. In order to ‘see’ this violence, the final section explores the 
case of white supremacist Mair, who assassinated Cox, in 2016. The case shows how 
violence perpetrated by white supremacists is individualised through ‘lone wolf’ and 
mental health narratives. White supremacist violence, to date, has not been read as a 
collective failure of white communities to challenge extremism nor does it lead to 
community-based counter-terrorism responses through Prevent. Evidence of 
extremist views that might be expected to lead to a Prevent referral embodied by Mair, 
such as anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment, are in fact part of mainstream 
British politics or business as usual. The case underlines why, despite claims to the 
contrary, Prevent cannot adequately challenge all forms of extremism because it 
represents continuation of white racial violence.  
In 2016, a week before the Brexit referendum, Mair, murdered the progressive 
Cox outside her constituency office in West Yorkshire. The Guardian reported: 
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They saw Mair swing the knife again and again as he stabbed Cox 15 times in her 
heart, lungs and abdomen. One blow pierced her chest after passing through her right 
arm. He did so, according to the eyewitness, while saying: “Britain first, keep Britain 
independent, Britain will always come first.” Finally, he yelled: “This is for 
Britain.” (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor, 2016).  
Mair was charged with murder, a common law offence, but prosecuted as a terrorist 
because his motives were political. Judge Justice Wilkie noted, “There is no doubt that 
this murder was done for the purpose of advancing a political, racial and ideological 
cause namely that of violent white supremacism and exclusive nationalism most 
associated with Nazism and its modern forms.” (Judiciary of England and Wales, 
2016). By locating Mair’s actions in the context of Nazism as the main source of white 
supremacism, Wilkie unwittingly distances the actions of this assassin from the here-
and-now of British politics. An analysis of media reporting further reveals that there 
was a clear attempt to separate the assassination from the racist context of Britain’s 
EU referendum, by casting Mair as a mentally ill loner with Nazi sympathies. Most 
strikingly for the analysis is that Mair was regarded as a ‘lone wolf’, who acted outside 
the structures of civilised British society (Cobain, Parveen, and Taylor, 2016; Thornton 
and Sommerlad, 2016).  
Lalami notes those labelled ‘terrorist’ in are black and brown bodies – or 
‘criminals in waiting’ - and yet, white male shooters remain the figure of the ‘Lone Wolf’ 
(2017). This ‘whiteness of the white wolf’ removes violent white men from the contexts 
in which they are produced. Koehler (2018) argues the consequence of this evacuation 
is the unseeing of, “armed white men are the largest terrorist threat in America at the 
moment— having killed more Americans in domestic terrorism incidents since 9/11 
than Muslim extremists.” She also claims the media gives lone wolves the ‘benefit of 
the doubt’ or reasons for why they might ‘snap’ including mental health problems. ITV 
News report, ‘Far-right obsessed loner Mair visited the Birstall Wellbeing Centre in his 
home town on the evening of June 15 to ask for advice on how to control his mental 
health.’ (Kelly, 2016) He was also described as a ‘loner and a Nazi sympathiser’ 
(Greenwood and Sinmaz, 2016). Placing Mair in the continuum of historic German 
fascism rather than contemporary racism in Britain, has dangerous consequences 
(Burgis, 2016).  
The understanding that Mair was exceptional to the usual order of business is 
important in erasing the complicity of mainstream commentators producing anti-
immigrant and anti-refugee sentiment central to his actions. Jones describes these 
narratives about Mair, as examples of ‘everyday white supremacism’ which should not 
be separated from the ‘virulent, overt and mostly un-accepted white supremacism (and 
related misogyny)’ (2019: 3). The views Mair expressed were fully embodied in the 
vote Leave campaign whose slogans included ‘Taking Back Control’ and ‘Vote Leave; 
Take Control’. Satnam Virdee and Brendan McGeever’s (2016) suggest these slogans 
were driven by imperial nostalgia and the reclaiming of a white Britishness under threat 
from the globalisation. Britain would rejuvenate its economic fortunes through a return 
to trading with Commonwealth countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and India). 
Britain would close the door on an EU which had allowed immigrants, asylum seekers 
and refugees to ‘flood in’ and ‘takeover’.  
It is precisely this loss of economic, political, and racial privilege, being 
resuscitated by the Brexiteer howl to ‘Put Britain First’. The politics of Cox, as a 
vociferous supporter of refugee rights, of the diversity of her constituency and her 
16 
 
support for the EU marked her out as a traitor to white Britain (Jones, 2019). From this 
perspective, Prevent racialised borders which mark out Muslim populations as security 
threats to white Britain, operate as everyday white supremacism. Prevent functions to 
normalise racial violence against Muslim populations through everyday bordering 
embodied in the Prevent Duty, and then erases knowledge of these practices as racial. 
The violence committed by Mair is a continuation of Prevent’s work of producing the 
racial borders of white Britain which need defending. The notion that Prevent deals 
with all forms of extremism, and that strategic importance in placed on threats which 
are most pressing, is a consummate example of white ignorance.  
Conclusion 
Following the conclusion of the EU referendum, Nigel Farage declared, ‘Today, 
honesty, decency and belief in nation, I think now is going to win. And we will have 
done it without having to fight, without a single bullet being fired’ (Saul, 2016). Farage’s 
words are emblematic of how logics of seeing/unseeing operate to hyper-visibilise and 
to unsee, differently racialised forms of political violence. To argue Brexit was 
accomplished without violence is to unsee the murder of Cox by a white supremacist. 
Even as Mair proclaimed his actions were for Britain, ‘to put Britain first’ - a formulation 
which only makes sense in a broader system of signification where minorities, 
refugees and asylum seekers, aided and abetted by a feckless EU are ‘taking over’ 
Britain – the assassination was ultimately unable to visibilise the very mainstream 
violence of the borders of white Britain. It is precisely this structured unseeing of white 
racial violence premised on white ignorance that enables Prevent’s postulation of 
racial borders and their reproduction in the everyday. 
To summarise, the use of TCATC and themes of codification of difference and 
seeing/unseeing has allowed for the recovery of Prevent’s racial borders, which were 
otherwise concealed through structures of white ignorance. The analysis reveals three 
central insights. The first is Prevent’s normalisation of white Britain and the 
racialisation of radicalisation and extremism which become code words for 
expressions of Muslimness. The second is how Prevent erases the racism which is 
bound up in identifying potential radicals through the language and practice of safe 
guarding and WRAP training. Finally, Prevent actively contributes to the production of 
racial violence perpetrated in defence of white Britain. These insights show that far 
from responding to all extremist threat, Prevent is part of a racial continuum of white 
violence and, thus, an inadequate policy response to the very real rise of transnational 
white supremacist violence. It is precisely the everyday ways in which white 
supremacism is generated that Prevent produces that are deeply troubling in this 
present juncture. This at a time when white supremacists acting to ‘take back control’ 
of their borders are organised, internationalised, and holding public office. Moreover, 
in light of the EU referendum and the forging of transatlantic alliances between British 
and US neo-Nazis, fascists, and white supremacists, and burgeoning white violence 
against racialised populations, Prevent is not fit for purpose in challenging all 
extremism threats.  
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